How Boko Haram can be defeated

By Max Siollun
The Nigerian military has struggled to
have any effect in the face of Boko
Haram’s intensifying attacks. But with the
right combination of military and non-
military, short- and long-term strategies,
the Islamist militants can be stopped, as
Max Siollun explains.
The casualties and suffering that have been
caused by the Islamist militant group Boko
Haram over the past five years are mind-
boggling. According to estimates, 12,000 people
have been killed, 8,000 thousand more have
been injured or maimed, and thousands of
innocent people have been displaced by the
conflict. Even more worryingly, around half of
those deaths have come in just the past year.
Nigeria is being haunted by the ghost of past
mistakes, and a gigantic coop of chickens has
come home to roost, though it is not as if the
country was not pre-warned. In the early 1980s,
northern Nigeria was rocked by a violent
uprising by an Islamic sect led by a
Cameroonian preacher known as “Maitatsine”.
4,000 people were killed and the commission
that investigated the violence reported:
“Because of the very wide gap between the rich
and the poor in our society…[Maitatsine’s sect]
were more than prepared to rise against the
society at the slightest opportunity.” The
commission advised: “This regrettable social
situation in our society ought to be remedied
immediately else it will continue to provide the
required recruitment potential for disenchanted
men…to rebel.”
The government did not heed these lessons. It
did little to address economic inequality or
religious extremism, leaving in place the
conditions under which Boko Haram could
emerge. The insurgency has flourished over the
past five years and the attempts to combat it
have largely fallen flat. With the right
combination of long-term planning and
execution, however, the Islamist militant group
can be defeated.
Tackling Boko Haram?
The methods deployed so far against Boko
Haram have had the same effect as pouring
petrol on an open fire. The Nigerian army has
been accused of mishandling the insurgency,
and any or all of: the indiscriminate use of
force, torturing innocent civilians, and being
reluctant to confront Boko Haram fighters.
The army might argue that there are mitigating
factors which hamper it. It is trained for
conventional warfare and peacekeeping
operations. Elaborate hostage rescues and
fighting AK-47 wielding Islamist biker gangs in
the middle of city centres are not its forte. Since
Nigeria has never experienced an insurgency of
this type or magnitude before, the army is in
the odd situation of being tested on the
battlefield first, and learning the lessons
afterwards. It has had to adapt to a new type of
war and learn on the job.
The terrain does not favour the army either.
The combined size of the three states in north-
eastern Nigeria worst affected by Boko Haram –
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States – is roughly
equal to that of Tunisia, or five times that of
Switzerland. Trying to hunt down militants
dressed in civilian attire, blended in with
millions of civilians in villages, towns, cities,
markets, and forests in an area that size with
only a few helicopters and aeroplanes is no
easy feat.
The army also faces operational challenges.
Some soldiers have complained of being under-
equipped and finding themselves outgunned by
heavily armed Boko Haram militants. More
accurately, the issue may be that the army is
incorrectly equipped for this type of conflict.
Earlier this year, Nigeria’s former Chief of
Defence Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai
astutely observed that: “Our military is properly
equipped to fight yesterday’s war”.
The federal government has been looking for a
silver bullet solution to crush the insurgency
with a single blow. However, they have
belatedly learned the same painful lesson that
the British learned with the IRA in Northern
Ireland and that America has been learning
with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan
and beyond. As the former Minister of the
Federal Capital Territory, Nasir El-Rufai, once
commented rhetorically: “Tell me where in the
world military action alone has solved an
insurgency.” And as Agwai conceded, “You can
never solve any of these problems with military
solutions…It is a political issue; it is a social
issue; it is an economic issue; and until these
issues are addressed, the military can never
give you a solution.”
But if military force cannot stop the insurgency,
what else can be done? The often-repeated
mantra is that economic development is the
antidote to violent extremism. However, who
will invest in a region wracked by violence and
insecurity and in which militants destroy any
signs of development, such as schools and
mobile telephone masts?
Government indecision
The government’s strategy so far has appeared
to be schizophrenic at times, vacillating between
vowing to “crush” Boko Haram, pleading with
them to negotiate, and offering them an
amnesty. The government’s approach has been
of saying the right things but at the wrong time,
or of doing the right things but in the wrong
way.
Military force and negotiations are part of the
solution, not all of it. And an amnesty should be
the end of the conflict resolution process, not
the start of it. In April 2013, the government
made itself look weak and desperate by offering
an amnesty to Boko Haram without getting
anything in return, while it also demonstrated
the government’s myopia about the group,
which does not recognise the secular Nigerian
government. The offer was contemptuously
rebuffed. Boko Haram does not even respect the
authority of venerated Islamic figures in
northern Nigeria, such as the emirs. Boko
Haram has either killed, or tried to kill, emirs
and imams who criticised their violence. This is
the equivalent of Christian rebels killing priests.
It is not all a tale of mishaps though. The
government is learning, albeit belatedly, and
has made some tentative steps in the right
direction. The National Security Adviser Colonel
Sambo Dasuki (retired) appointed Fatima Akilu,
a psychologist, to work as the Director of
Behavioural Analysis and Strategic
Communication in his office. Akilu has designed
a programme called “Countering Violent
Extremism” which maps out a blueprint for de-
radicalising and rehabilitating militants,
preventing others from being radicalised, and a
communication strategy to counter Boko
Haram’s narrative. The syllabus for military
cadets at the Nigerian Defence Academy has
also been modified to give cadets training in
counter-terrorism.
Meanwhile, a volunteer civilian security group
known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)
may have provided a template for community-
based security that can be applied elsewhere, if
refined. The CJTF is a cross between a
neighbourhood watch scheme and ruthless
vigilantes. Due to Nigeria’s massive ethno-
linguistic diversity, and the federal nature of its
security forces, police officers and soldiers are
often deployed in areas they have never been to
before and where they are complete strangers,
with no understanding of the local culture or
language. This makes it very difficult for them
to gain the cooperation or trust of locals. This is
where the CJTF can be of assistance. Although it
is armed only with rudimentary weapons such
as sticks, knives, and old rifles, the CJTF’s local
knowledge, and in some cases individual
knowledge of Boko Haram members, has
helped them “out” Boko Haram members to the
army.
The CJTF’s cooperation with regular security
forces has also helped deter attacks in
Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State and
biggest city in north-eastern Nigeria, and push
the militants out into more rural areas. In fact,
ironically, the CJTF’s success in Maiduguri may
have indirectly led to Boko Haram’s kidnap of
hundreds of schoolgirls in the town of Chibok
and elsewhere; with the CJTF present in
Maiduguri, Boko Haram moved out of the city
into more vulnerable areas with plenty of “soft
targets” such as schools.
Other political forums have also been
advocating good governance, economic
development, and education as solutions. These
are all noble suggestions, though it must be
noted that they will take years or even
generations to have effect. There is no bottle of
anti-terror pills that the government can get
from a chemist and force-feed to Boko Haram’s
fighters. Rather, it must drip-feed a cocktail of
anti-terror solutions into Boko Haram’s
ecosystem.
Iron fist in a velvet glove
The military alone cannot end the insurgency,
but it does have a crucial role to play. Military
force is the means that can be used to buy
enough “quiet time” for the government to
come up with permanent solutions. The military
must use enough force to either reduce the
frequency and intensity of Boko Haram’s
attacks, or pressurise it into considering a
ceasefire.
To do this, the intelligence agencies will have to
start by massively upgrading their poor
intelligence on Boko Haram. The evidence
suggests that Boko Haram has been more
successful at infiltrating the military than the
other way around.
Although Boko Haram acts like a ceasefire is a
non-starter, it is possible if the government
learns to speak the group’s language. The
concept of a Hudna (an Arabic phrase that can
mean “calm” or “cessation”) is a part of Islamic
jurisprudence recognised by other Islamic
insurgents, such as Palestine’s Hamas.
A Hudna can be a long-term cessation of
hostilities, lasting several years, which can also
be renewed. Given that the federal government
will never accept Boko Haram’s goal of an
Islamic theocracy within Nigeria’s borders and
that Boko refuses to subordinate itself to
Nigeria’s secular institutions, a long-term
Hudna may be a way of allowing both sides to
get what they want without losing face.
The government could propose a Hudna as a
temporary ceasefire or peace treaty, while Boko
Haram can claim it did not abandon its jihad
but sheathed its swords in a manner consistent
with its cosmology.
Right now though, Boko Haram has little reason
to consider a ceasefire. It has a large mobile
army, a massive stockpile of weapons and
ammunition, and controls several thousand
square kilometres of territory in north-eastern
Nigeria. The government must therefore create
its own bargaining chips to elevate its position
at the table. Leverage could come from taking
Boko Haram members alive as prisoners rather
than summarily executing them.
Prisoners would have strategic value as assets
that could be used to negotiate the release of the
hundreds of kidnapped children. Drying up the
reservoir of potential Boko Haram recruits
would also amplify the importance of Boko
Haram prisoners, by making their members
harder to replace.
The former British Chief of Defence Staff,
General Sir David Richards, believes that
“economic liberation” of the population is
critical in defeating doctrinal insurgencies. The
type of economic development that will
disincentivise young men from joining Boko
Haram though is not the typical Nigerian type
of grandiose white elephant projects that the
average man and woman care little about.
Instead, drip-fed investments on tangible
projects such as roads, water, jobs, and
electricity are more likely to undermine the
insurgents’ violent alternatives.
This war, however, must be fought not only on
the battlefield, but also by using the media and
educational establishments. The media, Koranic
schools and religious authorities have a key role
to play by challenging Boko Haram’s
interpretation of Islam, and by providing
alternate non-violent narratives. Nigeria must
also develop a counter-insurgency doctrine and
apply it uniformly across the military,
intelligence agencies, and teaching
establishments.
Ending this insurgency will also require a
regional solution. Nigeria cannot do this alone.
Nigeria is located in a “bad neighbourhood” in
which many of its counterparts, such as Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, and Mali are experiencing
insecurity too. Nigeria cannot expect to avoid
catching a cold if its neighbours sneeze, and
vice versa.
The morning after
With the right strategies, Nigeria can undermine
Boko Haram, militarily, economically and
psychologically. But the government must also
start preparing for “the morning after” today.
At some point, this insurgency will end and the
government will face difficult questions.
How will it re-house and compensate the
displaced people? What will it do about the
thousands of students whose education has
been disrupted by school closures and/or being
kidnapped? How will the victims who have
been raped, injured, or rendered orphans or
widows by Boko Haram react when they see
economic opportunities being given to people
who killed their family members?
One day, the same security forces that fought
Boko Haram may have to protect ex-militants
from score-settling attacks by their victims.
The short-term forecast for Nigeria is of more
bloodshed and violence between security forces
and Boko Haram. The long-term forecast is that
the insurgency can be terminated, but only by
thorough long-term planning, a robust military
strategy resolute enough to pressurise the
group, but flexible enough to rehabilitate
repentant militants, and creating space for
economic development. The solution to
Nigeria’s problem may well be bitter tasting
and slow-acting. But this anti-terror medicine is
one it will have to brace itself for and take.